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Free will is the ability to choose between different possible courses of action. It is closely linked to the concepts of responsibility, praise, guilt, sin, and other judgments which apply only to actions that are freely chosen. It is also connected with the concepts of advice, persuasion, deliberation, and prohibition. Traditionally, only actions that are freely willed are seen as deserving credit or blame. There are numerous different concerns about threats to the possibility of free will, varying by how exactly it is conceived, which is a matter of some debate. Free will is sometimes understood to mean ''origination'', the power to break the causal chain of events, so that one's choice is uncaused by any previous event, external or internal.〔Bobzien, Susanne, 2000. “Did Epicurus Discover the Free-Will Problem?” ''Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy'', 19: 287–337, p.289〕 The concern for this conception of free will is to reconcile the existence of free will thus conceived with the possibly deterministic nature of the universe. Determinism suggests that only one course of events is possible, which is inconsistent with the existence of free will thus conceived. As far as we know, this problem was first suggested by Aristotle in the fourth century B.C.E., but it is still a major focus of philosophical debate. This view that conceives free will to be incompatible with determinism is called ''incompatibilism'', and encompasses both metaphysical libertarianism, the claim that determinism is false and thus free will is at least possible, and hard determinism, the claim that determinism is true and thus free will is not possible. It also encompasses hard incompatibilism, which holds not only determinism but also its negation to be incompatible with free will, and thus free will to be impossible whatever the case may be regarding determinism. In contrast, ''compatibilists'' hold that free will ''is'' compatible with determinism. Some compatibilists even hold that determinism is ''necessary'' for free will, arguing that choice involves preference for one course of action over another, requiring a sense of ''how'' choices will turn out.〔An argument by Rudolph Carnap described by: 〕 Compatibilists thus consider the debate between libertarians and hard determinists over free will vs determinism a false dilemma.〔See, for example, 〕 Different compatibilists offer very different definitions of what "free will" even means, and consequently find different types of constraints to be relevant to the issue. Classical compatiblists considered free will nothing more than freedom of action, considering one free of will simply if, ''had'' one counterfactually wanted to do otherwise, one ''could'' have done otherwise without physical impediment. Contemporary compatibilists instead identify free will as a psychological capacity, such as to direct one's behavior in a way responsive to reason. And there are still further different conceptions of free will, each with their own concerns, sharing only the common feature of not finding the possibility of determinism a threat to the possibility of free will.〔http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/#ConCom〕 ==In Western philosophy== The underlying issue is: Do we have some control over our actions, and if so, what sort of control, and to what extent? These questions predate the early Greek stoics (for example, Chrysippus), and some modern philosophers lament the lack of progress over all these millennia.〔 〕〔 〕 On one hand, humans have a strong sense of freedom, which leads us to believe that we have free will.〔 〕〔 〕 On the other hand, an intuitive feeling of free will could be mistaken.〔〔 Quoted by Shariff, Schooler & Vohs: ''The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will'' For full text on line see (this ). 〕 It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the scientific view that the physical world can be explained to operate perfectly by physical law. The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either causal closure or physical determinism (nomological determinism) is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain, and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect). For example, the laws of physics (deterministic or not) have yet to resolve the hard problem of consciousness:〔 See (【引用サイトリンク】author=Josh Weisberg ) or 〕 "Solving the hard problem of consciousness involves determining how physiological processes such as ions flowing across the nerve membrane ''cause'' us to have experiences."〔 〕 According to some, "Intricately related to the hard problem of consciousness, the hard problem of free will represents ''the'' core problem of conscious free will: Does conscious volition impact the material world?"〔 〕 Even if the hard problem of consciousness is resolved, some authors argue it appears that "consciousness plays a far smaller role in human life than Western culture has tended to believe."〔 Quote from 〕 The puzzle of reconciling 'free will' with a deterministic universe is known as the ''problem of free will'' or sometimes referred to as the ''dilemma of determinism''. This dilemma leads to a moral dilemma as well: How are we to assign responsibility for our actions if they are caused entirely by past events?〔 Also found in 〕〔 〕 Historically, most of the philosophical effort invested in resolving the dilemma has taken the form of close examination of definitions and ambiguities in the concepts designated by "free", "freedom", "will", "choice" and so forth. Defining 'free will' often revolves around the meaning of phrases like ("ability to do otherwise" ) or ("alternative possibilities" ). This emphasis upon words has led some philosophers to claim the problem is merely verbal and thus a pseudo-problem.〔 〕 In response, others point out the complexity of decision making and the importance of nuances in the terminology. Below, some of these positions are outlined. Metaphysical libertarianism posits that free will does exist, and therefore any definition of determinism that precludes it is false. This view is one of several non-materialist constructions,〔 including the popular claim of being able to consciously veto an action or competing desire.〔Libet, (2003). "Can Conscious Experience affect brain Activity?", ''Journal of Consciousness Studies'' 10, nr. 12, pp 24–28.〕〔 Compatibilist theories have been developed based on the view of complementary vantage points in which "the experience of conscious free will is the first-person perspective of the () neural correlates of choosing."〔 〕〔 〕 Classical compatibilists have addressed the dilemma of free will by arguing that free will holds as long as we are not externally constrained or coerced. Modern compatibilists make a distinction between freedom of will and freedom of ''action'', that is, separating freedom of choice from the freedom to enact it. Given that humans all experience a sense of free will, some modern compatibilists think it is necessary to accommodate this intuition.〔 referring to a critique of Libet's experiments by 〕〔 〕 For example, some modern compatibilists in psychology have tried to revive traditionally accepted struggles of free will with the formation of character.〔 〕 Compatibilist free will has also been attributed to our natural sense of agency, where one must believe they are an agent in order to function and develop a theory of mind. A different approach to the dilemma is that of incompatibilists, namely, that if the world is deterministic then, our feeling that we are free to choose an action is simply an illusion. Fundamental debate continues over whether the physical universe is in fact deterministic. Physical models offered at present are both deterministic and indeterministic, and are subject to interpretations of quantum mechanics - which themselves are being constrained by ongoing experimentation. Yet even with physical indeterminism, arguments have been made against the feasibility of incompatibilist free will in that it is difficult to assign ''Origination'' (responsibility for "free" indeterministic choices). Since the term "free will" (''liberum arbitrium'') was introduced by Christian philosophy (4th century CE) it has always meant (until the Enlightenment proposed its own meanings) lack of necessity in human will,〔A. Schopenhauer, ''On the Freedom of the Will'', c. 1, "What is freedom?"〕 so that "the will is free" meant "the will does not have to be such as it is." This view was universally embraced by both incompatibilists and compatibilists.〔Hence the notion of contingency appeared as the very opposition of necessity, so that wherever a thing is considered dependent or relies upon another thing, it is contingent and thus not necessary.〕 Free will here is predominately treated with respect to physical determinism in the strict sense of nomological determinism, although other forms of determinism are also relevant to free will.〔 For example, logical and theological determinism challenge metaphysical libertarianism with ideas of destiny and fate, and biological, cultural and psychological determinism feed the development of compatibilist models. Separate classes of compatibilism and incompatibilism may even be formed to represent these.〔 See also 〕 Below are the classic arguments bearing upon the dilemma and its underpinnings. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「free will」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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